India has spent the last ten years asking itself if technology can assist its population of 1.4 billion in overcoming the natural barriers that come with its size, but today that question has moved beyond its boundaries. The issue now is whether a country that has used technology to improve access domestically can assist other countries. This explains Prime Minister Modi’s recent meeting with the board of GSMA. Online security, finding solutions to the digital divide and ensuring that everyone has affordable access to technology were some of the topics discussed, all leading to what could be interpreted as the development of a new foreign policy for India.
It should clearly define a goal for that doctrine. It should not aim to export an ‘Indian model’. Equally, the success should not be measured by the number of countries adopting the Indian platform. India’s foundational idea is to support the idea of technological sovereignty for countries unable to afford technological non-immersion. This is significant since there has been a transformation of the old digital divide.
Initially, there was a divide between those who have and those who do not have access to technology. The new divide is between those countries using digital systems while having meaningful control over them and those countries whose digitalization makes them reliant on external providers for essential infrastructure, standards, data, payment, cloud capacity, or artificial intelligence. Consequently, the next challenge in development can be the digital dependency divide.
India is in an ideal position to solve this problem. Aadhaar, the Unified Payments Interface and the wider framework of digital public infrastructure have proven that foundational digital rails can drive innovation on a large scale. During India’s presidency of G20, this experience accumulated by India has turned into a proposal for the whole world. The Joint Declaration approved by the leaders who participated in the summit endorsed the Global Digital Public Infrastructure Repository and recognised the necessity of open, interoperable and reliable systems together with building the capacities of low- and middle-income countries.
It is necessary to understand the difference between infrastructure and dependency. Most traditional technology diplomacy is initiated by a vendor who sells a network, cloud service, platform or equipment. India can actually start from the state’s ability to make a choice. Digital public infrastructure presupposes the best possible construction of common rails for governments, businesses and people.
UPI shows both the promise and limitations of this model. In August 2026, UPI processed over 24.5 billion transactions worth close to ₹29.8 lakh crore. UPI’s global footprint is also increasing: the ‘UPI One World‘ facility was made available to representatives from over 40 countries during the India AI Impact Summit in February. But the success of UPI at home cannot be used to take it abroad. Payments rely on banks and regulators. Digital identity depends on constitutional decisions on privacy and the role of state. Technologies travel but institutions don’t.
This must be a principle of Indian technology diplomacy: serve capability not dependency. Instead of taking Aadhaar or UPI to other countries, India can help them build the regulatory, technical and institutional capability to develop their own solutions. It’s not about duplication; it’s about empowerment.
Similar to how it has the capacity to carve out a niche for itself in a world that is becoming increasingly characterized by technological blocs. The US is the hub of modern innovation. China boasts extensive infrastructure and platform capabilities. Europe is now a powerful regulatory authority. It doesn’t have to follow the example of any of the three. India could be good at providing interoperability, thereby becoming that country that can mediate and facilitate the work of technology ecosystems and make the life of developing countries easier.
This means that the idea of India’s strategic autonomy can be translated to the digitalized world we live in today. Strategic autonomy has always been considered to apply to the realm of defense, energy, or great-power alignment. But now, whatever one does with financial networks, information storage, cloud computing, and standardization can be considered as a contribution to sovereignty.
The threat of cyberattacks makes the debate increasingly relevant. The potential of digitizing numerous sectors means that vulnerabilities will also multiply. Millions navigating an online payment system put themselves at risk when they go online. Public administration institutions embracing new technologies may become victims of digital disruption attacks. Countries that invest in information technology without establishing sufficient cybersecurity systems will soon discover that they can build effective communications but ineffective states. Therefore, India should cooperate with other nations for more than just infrastructure establishment.
Artificial intelligence creates an additional challenge. The affordability of synthetic media and the growing difficulty to distinguish them from authentic content signify that regulation matters more than access to AI technologies. Recent statements of Prime Minister Modi emphasize the need for authenticity labels, watermarks, and more evident source requirements, which can contribute to the development of international partnerships.
Connectivity, security, standards, and AI governance are things which are integrated and will have to be treated as one comprehensive diplomatic subject. Connectivity without prices prevents some people from participating in it. Access without cybersecurity puts can people at risk. Infrastructure without institutions means people’s vulnerability. AI without trust is just useless technology. Any respectable technology diplomacy has to deal with technology as a whole.
India must avoid the mistake of discussing the Global South as a single body. Kenya, Indonesia, Brazil, and island nations do not share the same institutions, market systems, and international relations. A lot of countries will keep using the technologies of the USA, China, Europe, India, and their own countries.
There is also a domestic test to bear in mind. India cannot be sincere in its argument for a fair digital order abroad when it conducts its own digital growth at home by treating issues such as digital education, cost, privacy, cybersecurity, and digital access inequalities as already dealt with. Indian tech diplomacy will determine its success by portraying Digital India as not a perfect model but rather a lab where there are many lessons to be learned from the successes and mistakes of the initiative.
That is why the most valuable asset that India develops may not be Aadhaar, UPI, or any specific service but rather the notion that the developing countries do not have to choose between technological isolation and technological dependency.
If India manages to implement this idea, Digital India will obtain a much wider meaning. It will turn into the base for new statecraft that will allow going through globalization processes without missing the opportunity to govern these processes.
